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1. Introduction 
 
For the last two decades, a number of European countries have been implementing 
significant changes in the organisational and regulatory frameworks of their local 
public transport systems (Van de Velde 1999, MARETOPE 2002). These reforms, 
promoted by the European Commission (European Commission 2002), aim at curbing 
the decline of the sector, restoring economic efficiency and improving the quality of 
the service in a context of severe public budget constraints. The hypothesis underlying 
these policies is therefore that organisational and regulatory settings affect 
performance.  
Our main objective in this paper is to test this hypothesis by investigating to what 
extent the ownership structure and the type of regulatory contract influence the 
transport operator’s performance. More precisely, our aim is to assess the impact of 
the property regime and of the contractual risk-sharing rules on the technical 
efficiency of the French urban transport operators. This case is indeed of particular 
interest because, in France, the local authorities in charge of regulating the 
procurement of urban public transport services can choose between several modes of 
provision. Direct administration (“régie”) is one possibility but authorities massively 
(90%1) prefer to turn to the technical expertise and the managerial skills of private 
operators and contract out the operation of services either to semi-public companies 
(“sociétés d’économie mixte”) or to fully private firms. Moreover, once they have 
decided to delegate, authorities have then to select the type of regulatory contract they 
will sign with the operator. Three main categories of delegation contracts are 
traditionally distinguished, according to the type and proportion of risks that are 
shouldered by each contracting party. This variety of governance structures and 
contractual practices therefore provides a great opportunity to test the core hypotheses 
of contract theory according to which ownership structures and contractual choices 
are key determinants of performances. To our knowledge, no other empirical studies 
of the French urban public transport sector have already addressed both issues.  
Our second contribution regards the methodology and the data that we use. To test our 
proposition and obtain an indicator of technical efficiency, we use an original panel 
data set covering 135 different French urban transport networks over the period 1995-
2002 and we apply the production frontier methodology developed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995). The empirical literature in transport economics makes an intensive use 
of frontier approaches to assess the efficiency of transportation systems (Oum, Waters, 
Yu 1999; De Borger, Kerstens, Costa 2002). However, these works either simply 
ignore the impact of contractual arrangements and regulatory policies on efficiency, or 
take these variables into account but use a two-stage method that we consider as ad-
hoc and inconsistent (Dalen, Gomez-Lobo 2003). The present paper is therefore 
original on two other aspects. Firstly, our work is one of the few that studies both the 
level of efficiency and the effects of ownership structure and regulatory contract in the 
French urban transport system (Kerstens 1996), and the only one to use the data of the 
“1995-2002 period”. Secondly, our paper uses a stochastic frontier model that 
simultaneously estimates the networks production function and the production 
inefficiency for each network, taking into account variables that do not impact on the 
production technology per se but may explain why some networks are more or less far 
from their production frontier.  
                                                 
1
 Sources : GART (2002), CERTU (2003). 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the regulatory and 
contractual framework of public urban transport in France and provides some 
descriptive statistics of the current situation of this sector. In section 3, we develop our 
model and hypotheses. Section 4 presents our dataset. Section 5 discusses our 
empirical findings and section 6 offers a summary of our findings as well as 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Organization of the French urban public transport sector 
In the last two decades, France is one of the few European countries to have 
experienced a growth in transit ridership (Kerstens 1996). Local authorities have been 
very proactive in promoting urban transport, especially since the 1982 Law (the 
Domestic Transport Orientation Law, known as the LOTI law), which made them 
responsible for the organization and the management of their transit system. 
Investments in urban public transport infrastructure (as well as in equipment and 
rolling stock) and promotion of this mode of transportation have been a way for local 
authorities to improve the quality of life in their municipality and to show their 
concerns on environmental issues.  
The institutional context in which urban transport services are provided in France can 
be concisely portrayed as follows.  
As already mentioned, responsibility for urban public transport (UPT from now on) is 
decentralised to the local authorities2 (LA from now on). This means that they have 
the authority to define the characteristics as well as the level of services to be 
procured and to choose the mode of organization of their urban transport system. 
More precisely, the LA define the network route, schedules, fares as well as the 
amount of subsidies given to the sector. As regard organizational choices, regulatory 
rules prevent competition on the market, that is the coexistence of several operators in 
the same transport perimeter. The UPT services have therefore to be supplied by a 
single operator and for a certain period of time. The LA can nevertheless choose 
between several modes of organization for the procurement of these services. 
Indeed, they may decide to operate the service directly, in which case the operator is a 
public administration (“régie”). They may also choose to delegate the operation to a 
semi-public company3 (“société d’économie mixte”) or to a private company within 
the framework of a contractual agreement. In this latter case, the contractor is selected 
through a tendering process.  
As shown by figure 2, local authorities massively (69%) prefer to turn to the technical 
expertise and the managerial skills of private operators, that is to say to contract out 
the operation of services to private companies. Therefore, France is among several 
Western European countries (UK, Scandinavian countries) where the private sector is 
playing a substantial role in the urban transit industry. The “hybrid” solution, which 
consists in operating the service via a mixed company, is nevertheless a widespread 
practice, with 21% of the LA choosing this procurement mode, while direct 
administration is the less preferred option (10%). 
                                                 
2
 The local authority can be any municipality or association of municipalities. Various legal forms of 
associations coexist (see GART 2002 for more details on this institutional aspect). 
3
 In this case, the majority of the capital stock (at least 51%) is under public control. 
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-Figure 1: Modes of organization of the French UPT in 2002- 
(in % of the number of networks)4 
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mixed company
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In the case where the LA delegates the operation of the service, three forms of 
regulatory contracts can be envisaged. Indeed, the legal framework of the UPT sector 
specifies the main types of arrangements that can be used. These formal contracts 
between the local authority (the franchisor) and the operator (the franchisee) mainly 
differ in their degree of risk-sharing. Basically, this typology focuses on two types of 
on-going risks: the production risk, that is the risk associated to the production costs 
of a fixed production quantity, independent of the amount of passengers, and the 
revenue risk, that is the risk associated to the sale of transport services. These risks 
can be allocated in different ways. The various possible allocations of risks give rise 
to the following basic classification of contracts: 
 
 Net cost contract: in this type of contract, both production and revenue risk are 
borne by the transport company. The difference between anticipated total 
operating costs and revenues determines the price the local authority pays to the 
transport company. A realised difference between costs and revenues that does 
not correspond to the anticipated difference between costs and revenues is for 
account of the transport company; 
 Gross cost contract: in this type of contract the production risk is taken by the 
transport company while the revenue risk is borne by the local authority. An 
agreed price will be paid for the production of a fixed amount of services. 
Revenues accrued to the local authority. The difference between realised 
production costs and anticipated production costs is for account of the transport 
company; 
 Management contract: the management contract is the mirror image of the net 
cost contract because in the management contract both production and revenue 
risk are borne by the local authority instead of the transport company. The 
manager of the transport activities receives a remuneration which is (in the pure 
form of this contract) independent of his achievements. This last category is 
therefore risk-free for the operator. 
 
This typology therefore echoes the traditional distinction between fixed-price and 
cost-plus contracts (Laffont & Tirole 1993). Indeed, the two first types of contracts 
                                                 
4
 Source: our database of 165 local authorities out of a total of 241 existing local authorities in France. 
This dataset is described later on in the paper. 
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(net cost and gross cost contracts) are variants of fixed-price contracts whereas 
management contracts correspond to cost-plus contracts. To our knowledge, all the 
empirical studies dealing with the organization of the French UPT sector have 
restricted the variety of contractual arrangements to this binary typology (Kerstens 
1996, 1999, Gagnepain 1998, Gagnepain & Ivaldi 2002). One of our objectives in this 
paper is to use a more sophisticated classification to describe the contractual practices 
of the LA and to analyse their impact on performance. We intend to investigate 
whether gross cost contracts and net costs contracts are equivalent in terms of 
incentives to technical efficiency. Therefore, in our study of the effects of contractual 
choices on technical efficiency, we will distinguish between the three kinds of 
contracts that have been described above and that correspond to the current practices 
of the LA.  
This typology is modelled in table 1, adapted from Quinet and Vickerman (2004). 
 
-Table 1: A typology of urban public transport delegation contracts- 
  Production risk borne by 
  Local Authority Operator 
Local 
Authority 
Management contract : 
pi = pie 
s = s
e
 + (re-r)-(ce-c) 
Gross Cost Contract : 
pi = pie - (c-ce) 
s = s
e
 + (re-r) Revenue 
risk 
borne by 
Operator 
 Net Cost Contract : 
pi = pie + (r-re)- (c-ce) 
s = s
e
 
 
Where pie is the operator’s expected profit and pi his realised profit; 
s
e
 is the amount of subsidies the local authority is expected to give to the 
operator and s the amount he finally receives; 
r
e
 is the expected commercial revenues and r the realised revenues; 
c
e
 is the expected operating costs and c the effective operating costs. 
In fact, besides these three types of contracts, all kinds of variants are possible. The 
most interesting are the gross cost contract with revenue incentives and the net cost 
contract with shared revenue risk. Additional incentives for the realisation of special 
objectives can be added in all types of contract, for example, a premium that is related 
to the number of passengers or a positive influence on the modal split. However, in 
this paper, since we could not have access to all the contracts, we had to retain the 
basic typology described above, which is, nevertheless, more precise than the binary 
typology used in previous studies. 
Figure 3 reports the share of each contractual type in 2002 for our sample of 165 
networks. As indicated on the figure, a fourth type of contract -the concession 
contract- is utilized but only in a minority of cases. In this form of contract, not only 
does the operator shoulder the industrial and commercial risks, but he also has to 
realize the investments in dedicated infrastructure, equipment and rolling stock. This 
  6 
type of contract is therefore associated with longer duration but is rarely used by the 
local authorities who prefer to delegate only the operation.  
As can be noticed, few local authorities who choose to delegate the operation of the 
UPT services adopt management contracts (20%). The vast majority of them (80%) 
rather turn to contracts involving a positive risk-sharing, that is to say producing 
higher incentives. 
 
-Figure 2: Modes of delegation of the French UPT in 2002- 
(in % of the number of networks)5 
Management 
contract
20%
Concession
2%
Net cost 
contracts
51%
Gross cost 
contract
27%
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by table 2 and figure 3, this preference for high-powered 
incentives contracts is consistent with the trend that has been observed for three 
decades and which reveals a clear determination of the LA to make the operators bear 
a growing proportion of risks. Indeed, while in the seventies, cost-plus contracts were 
employed in 100% of the cases, this proportion has significantly fallen from the 
eighties to reach a level of 25% in the nineties.  
 
-Table 2: Evolution of the proportion of LA using management contracts6- 
 
Decade 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 
Average proportion of management contracts 100% 60% 25% 
 
                                                 
5
 Source: our database of 165 local authorities. 
6
 Sources: CERTU (2003) and GART (2002). 
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-Figure 3: Evolution of the modes of delegation of the French UPT- 
(in % of the number of networks)7 
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In other words, many authorities that previously used cost-plus contracts have now 
switched to fixed-price contracts, which have therefore become the most popular type 
of delegation arrangements.  
In proposing private operators more high-powered incentives contracts, the objective 
of the LA was to try and reduce the financial support needed to insure the 
procurement of UPT services. As in most countries, subsidies are inevitable in the 
French urban transit system since budgets are rarely balanced. Thus, for 2002, 
revenues from fares were estimated to cover only 34% of the operating costs in 
average, which corresponds to an operating deficit of more than  1.6 billions8. 
Consequently, additional sources of financing are required. These financial supports 
can come from the budget of the local authorities (1260m in 2002), from selective 
state subsidies (112m in 2002) or from a special tax (“le versement transport9”) 
(1864m in 2002).  
 
One reason for the budget being unbalanced is that transport companies face a variety 
of community service obligations and operate under ‘universal service, universal 
price’. Indeed, prices are regulated by LA and maintained at a low level in order to 
ensure affordable access to all consumers of public transportation. Moreover, special 
fares are provided to special groups like pensioners and students.  
But, another source of explanation might be the inefficiency of operators. In view of 
the financial situation that we have described, it is indeed of interest to determine 
whether urban transport operators are working in a technically efficient way. 
Furthermore, considering the variety of regulatory contracts existing in the French 
system and the organizational changes that the local authorities have introduced for 
two decades, it is of even greater interest to investigate the link between contractual 
choices and technical efficiency.  
 
                                                 
7
 Source: our database of 165 local authorities. 
8
 Source: GART (2002).  
9
 This is a unique French locally levied tax, earmarked for supporting public transport and paid by any 
local company with more than nine employees operating within the transport perimeter.  
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3. Hypotheses and model 
Our objective in this paper is to contribute to the discussions on the respective merits 
of private and public provision and on the relative impacts of various regulatory 
contracts on technical efficiency. In other words, we aim at investigating to what 
extend different types of property regimes and different kinds of delegation contracts 
affect operator performance.  
 
 Ownership structure, contracts and performance: some hypotheses 
 
The issue of the performance differential between public and private has motivated a 
large amount of empirical studies since the 1950’s and is still largely debated. There is 
indeed no clear consensus in the theoretical literature as to whether private 
monopolies outperform public ones and the empirical literature also remains 
inconclusive (Megginson & Netter 2001). However, in this paper, we support and 
intend to test the basic argument developed in incomplete contract theory according to 
which production is organized and carried out more efficiently in a privatized firm 
than in a public firm for at least two main reasons: firstly, because the objectives of a 
private firm are clearer and less diffuse and secondly because better incentives can be 
given to the managers and workers (Tirole 1994, Schmidt 1996, Hart, Shleifer, 
Vishny 1997). Moreover, in our case, private participation is associated with ex ante 
competition since delegation contracts are awarded through a tendering process, while 
direct public administration is not subject to such competitive pressures. Competition 
issues therefore reinforce the expectation that public service provision tends to be less 
efficient than private service provision. Hence, our first hypothesis is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Private operators show higher performance than public ones. 
 
Considering that, in our case, there is also a hybrid ownership regime -the semi-public 
regime-, we have to complete hypothesis 1a. Since in the mixed regime (“société 
d’économie mixte”) the majority of the capital of the operator is under public control, 
we assume that this hybrid regime is in between the two other modes in terms of 
efficiency. We indeed expect the semi-public operators to perform better than 
completely public ones because these hybrid structures may introduce some of the 
expertise, incentives and managerial skills of the private sector. However, because of 
remaining bureaucratic rigidities and due to the absence of competition in the 
selection process of semi-public operators, this form of governance is assumed to lead 
to worse efficiency than the completely private one. In other words, we conjecture 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Semi-public operators show higher performance than public 
ones but lower performance than private operators. 
 
It is important at this stage to discuss the definition of performance that we use and 
consider as appropriate for this study. We decided to use technical efficiency 
measures rather than profitability ratios or price indexes for several reasons  
Technical efficiency refers to the degree to which service provision is maximised 
given the resources at hand10 and its measurement involves a comparison between 
                                                 
10
 Depending on the circumstances, efficiency can also be measured from the opposite orientation, as 
the degree to which resource consumption is minimized to satisfy service demand. 
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observed and optimal values of services and resources. Therefore, focusing on 
technical efficiency to compare public and private provision of utilities allows us not 
to worry about the manifold and sometimes contradictory objectives public operators 
may have (Blank 2000). Indeed, technical efficiency is the only objective which does 
not prevent the achievement of other goals. “Being technically inefficient cannot be 
justified on the basis of other objectives [and, in the same way], allocating too many 
resources to a production process for social or environmental reasons does not 
necessarily imply that the allocation is technically inefficient” (European Commission 
1999, page 114).  
Moreover, this indicator of physical performance less suffers from problems of data 
availability and reliability. The information required to measure technical efficiency 
are the service and resource quantities, which are very often available at the firm level 
and are, most of the time, more reliable than financial or monetary data (like profits or 
costs for instance). 
 
We will come back later in this section on the methodology that we use to evaluate 
technical efficiency. For now, we would like to go on with the discussion on the 
potential explanatory variables of efficiency differential. Indeed, other aspects than 
the ownership regime might be considered in the analysis of operators’performances. 
The second dimension we would like to study is the type of contractual agreement 
governing delegation. As described earlier, the French urban transport market is 
heavily regulated and this regulation appeals to three main types of contracts which 
differ in their degree of risk-sharing (management, gross cost and net cost contracts).  
This produces some useful heterogeneity with respect to the power of contracts faced 
by firms and our second objective in this article is to investigate the respective impact 
of these different types of contractual practices on technical efficiency.  
The basic argument developed in the contract theory literature is that cost-plus 
contracts produce lower incentives than fixed-price contracts (Laffont & Tirole 1993, 
Bajari & Tadelis 2001). An operator whose costs are entirely reimbursed by the local 
authority does not have the same incentives to reduce these costs as an operator who 
bears all industrial risks. Therefore, cost-plus contracts are assumed to lead to a worse 
use of the production factors.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Cost-plus contracts (i.e. management contracts in our 
typology) provide lower technical efficiency than fixed-price 
contracts (either gross cost or net cost contracts). 
 
Furthermore, in order to take into account the diversity of the current contractual 
practices in the French UPT sector, that is the existence of two types of fixed-price 
contracts, we develop the following hypothesis regarding the respective impact of 
gross cost contracts and net cost contracts on technical efficiency:  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Net cost contracts and gross cost contracts are equivalent in 
terms of incentives to technical efficiency. 
 
Indeed, we consider that operators are incited to be technically efficient when they 
bear industrial risks but that supporting commercial risks does not affect their 
incentive to minimize production costs (Hart, Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Therefore, 
whatever the proportion of commercial risks supported by operators under fixed-price 
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contracts, that is to say whatever the type of fixed-price contract regulating the 
operators, their effort to organize the production efficiently and reduce costs might be 
the same.  
To our knowledge, this hypothesis has never been tested even in the empirical 
researches dealing with the French UPT (Gagnepain 1998, Gagnepain & Ivaldi 2002, 
Kerstens 1996, 1999). Therefore, one of the contributions of our paper regarding the 
analysis of the French transport sector, and more broadly regarding the analysis of 
contractual forms, is the introduction of two types of fixed-price contracts. We intend 
such a distinction to enable us to deepen the analysis of the determinants of technical 
inefficiency and to give a more precise answer to the question we are addressing: is 
there a contractual design that is particularly suited to induce technical efficiency? 
As deplored by De Borger et al. (2002), whereas the UPT sector has given rise to a lot 
of empirical works aimed at assessing the performance of the sector, too few studies 
have so far empirically looked at the impact of contractual arrangements to derive 
useful conclusions for regulatory policies. With this paper, we intend to somewhat 
bridge this gap. 
 
 A model for technical inefficiency effects 
 
Since the seminal paper by Farrell (1957), who was the first to introduce the idea of 
best-practice frontiers, two sources of productive inefficiency are distinguished: 
technical and allocative inefficiency. Basically, technical inefficiency arises from an 
excessive use of inputs whereas allocative inefficiency is due to the wrong choice of 
technically efficient combinations given input prices. Any attempt to measure 
productive efficiency and analyse its determinants must therefore start by an 
estimation of the technical efficiency.  
As suggested in the literature, there exists a wide range of methods that can be applied 
to evaluating the technical efficiency of a given firm or organisation (Murillo-
Zamarano 2004). Furthermore, efficiency assessment has received considerable 
attention in the literature with regard to urban public transportation (De Borger et al. 
2002). Among the more common approaches11, the preferred one within the discipline 
of economics, and the one we use in this paper, is the stochastic production frontier. 
More precisely, we use the panel model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
Thus, the stochastic production frontier12 of firm i in time t is defined by: 
yit = f(xit, zit ; β) + vit - uit 
where yit represents the production level of the i-th firm at date t; xit is a vector of 
inputs of the i-th firm at date t; zit is a vector of environmental variables for the i-th 
firm at date time t; β is a vector of unknown parameter to be estimated. The vit and uit 
are random variables. More precisely, vit is the idiosyncratic error component of the 
stochastic part. It corresponds to the usual disturbance introduced in regression 
models, and therefore represents all types of omitted or unobservable variables that 
have unbounded effects on output (such as weather uncertainty or measurement 
                                                 
11
 The three more common approaches are (1) parametric linear programming approach, (2) data 
envelopment analysis and (3) stochastic production frontier. For a description of these different 
approaches, see Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998) or Coelli, Estache, Perelman & Trujillo (2003). 
12
 The production frontier gives the maximum output that can be produced from a specified set of 
inputs, given the existing technology available or, put differently, the minimum resources employed for 
producing a certain level of output. 
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errors). uit is the technical inefficiency component of the stochastic part. It is therefore 
supposed to be a non-negative valued random variable (uit ≥ 0) and it captures the 
technical and economic inefficiency under control of the operator. 
The vit are assumed to be iid N(0, σv²) random errors, independently distributed of the 
uit. The uit are assumed to be independently distributed as truncated normal N(witδ, 
σu²), where wit is a vector of explanatory variables that affect technical inefficiency of 
firms over time and δ is a vector of unknown coefficients. 
The parameters β and δ are estimated simultaneously with the method of maximum 
likelihood and the likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance 
parameters, 222 vu σσσ +=  and ( )222 vuu σσσγ += . γ measures the importance of the 
variance of production inefficiency relative to total variance. A value close to one 
indicates that productive inefficiency is important relative to the random noise term 
affecting production level (for a more detailed explanation of this method, see 
Kumbhakar & Knox Lovell 2000). 
 
A first advantage of this method is that it formulates a model for the technical 
inefficiency effects, which is not done in many studies estimating stochastic 
production frontiers. The second advantage is that it allows estimating simultaneously 
the parameters of the stochastic production frontier and the parameters of the 
inefficiency model. Therefore, this approach is statistically more relevant than the 
two-stage approach used in several studies which consists in predicting the technical 
inefficiency effects via the estimation of a stochastic production frontier and then 
regressing the inefficiency measures obtained in the first stage on some explanatory 
variables. Thus, in the first stage, inefficiency effects are assumed to be identically 
distributed whereas in the second stage these error terms are assumed to depend on 
some other variables. The model developed by Battese and Coelli allows avoiding this 
inconsistency (Dalen & Gomez-Lobo 2002).  
 
4. Data 
This subsection offers more details on the sample and the definition of our variables. 
The database used here assembles the results of two annual surveys conducted by the 
Centre d’Etude et de Recherche du Transport Urbain (CERTU), a ministerial agency, 
on the one hand, and the Groupement des Autorités Responsables du Transport 
(GART), a nationwide trade organization that gathers most of the local authorities in 
charge of a urban transport network on the other hand. The data are available between 
1995 and 2002 and for a total of 165 networks (out of 241).  
For a purpose of homogeneity, we have excluded the networks with at least one mass 
transit system (subway and tramway) which have obviously a different production 
function. We have also reduced our sample by excluding the small networks (under 
30,000 inhabitants) that are also assumed to have a different production function. In 
addition, several observations (network-year) were discarded (99) because some data 
were missing or were suspected to be wrong after a careful scanning of the data13.  
The result is an unbalanced panel of 981 yearly observations that covers 135 different 
urban transport networks over eight recent years. This database is the biggest and the 
                                                 
13
 It is assumed that this suspect observations were randomly distributed, such that the sample is still 
representative. 
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most updated on the French UPT system and one of the biggest ever used in the sector 
(De Borger et al. 2002).  
 
Output and inputs 
De Borger et al. (2002), in a recent survey of frontier studies in the urban transport 
sector, reported that an important characteristic of empirical studies is the wide 
variability in the use of inputs and outputs in urban technology specifications. This 
variability in the input and output measures suggests that there is no generally 
accepted set of relevant variables in the bus industry.  
Our output variable is the number of vehicle-kilometres. Other output measures can 
be found in the transportation literature. The definition of outputs is indeed the subject 
of numerous debates. Some authors argue that demand-related indicators (e.g. 
passenger-km or number of passengers) are more relevant than pure supply indicators 
(e.g. vehicle-km or seat km) because they take into account the economic motive for 
providing services (Berechman 1993). Ignoring demand may lead to consider that the 
most efficient operators are those whose buses are empty. Although this argument is 
powerful, the definition of output we retain in this paper is supply-orientated. The 
main argument explaining our choice is that inputs do not necessarily vary with 
demand-related measures, and therefore do not provide a reliable description of the 
underlying technology. Moreover, as put by De Borger et al. (2002), “independent of 
the achievement of broader goals defined in terms of passenger transit services 
actually consumed, supplying bus services in the least costly way may be considered a 
reasonable requirement for operators” (De Borger et al. 2002, page 18). 
The inputs we consider in our study are the most frequently used in the literature. 
Indeed, our input set consists of capital, labour and energy. Capital is measured by the 
number of vehicles (bus, trolleybus, minibus, etc…) used to provide the service. We 
could not have enough reliable financial data to create another indicator of capital 
expenses. However, although incomplete, our indicator takes into account the major 
part of capital, that is rolling stock. Labour is measured by the number of employees 
including temporary work and subcontracting personnel with no distinction between 
driving labour and non-driving labour. At last, energy is measured in equivalent diesel 
m3.  
We are aware that differences between operators may exist in terms of quality and 
composition of inputs. Thus, for instance, rolling stock consists of various vintages 
with different energy consumptions and used at different intensities. However, our 
data did not allow us correcting for input quality differences. The completion and 
refinement of the database is ongoing and we intend to be able to use more precise 
data in our future researches.  
Besides these input variables, two control variables are used. The first one is the 
length of the network (in kilometres). This variable is supposed to be a proxy of 
exogenous environmental characteristics of the network such as the size of the city 
and the existence of natural barriers. Since network’s length is determined by the local 
authority, this variable also captures the public services obligations imposed to the 
operator (e.g. extensions to the suburbs). The network’s length is assumed to have a 
positive impact on the level of production. We indeed consider that an operator is 
more productive in terms of vehicle-km if the network stretches far away, notably 
because the speed outside the city is higher than inside.  
  13 
The second control variable is the number of inhabitants in the city or the group of 
cities controlled by the LA. This variable allows us controlling for the demand impact 
on technical efficiency. Its effect on the level of production is supposed to be positive 
since we assume that the more inhabitants, the more vehicles-kilometres supplied by 
the operator. 
Descriptive statistics on our output and input variables are provided in table 3. 
 
-Table 3: Sample descriptive statistics of the input and output variables- 
135 networks and 8 years 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Vehicle-km 
(Y) 2 461 508 2 543 857 178 106 11 380 524 
Labour 
(XLAB) 145,50 165,40 8 958,75 
Energy (XEN) 1 110,41 1 261,97 63 6 005,56 
Vehicles 
(XVE) 64 64 5 365 
Network 
length (ZNL) 157,20 127 14 645 
Population 
(ZPOP) 100 593 77 102 22 579 380 375 
 
Organisational variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, that is to say to assess the influence of ownership and 
contractual choices on efficiency, the organisational variables we introduce in the 
inefficiency model are the following:  
• PUBLIC is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the operator in a particular 
year is a public administration and 0 otherwise; 
• MIXED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the operator in a particular is 
a semi-public company and 0 otherwise;  
• PRIVATE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the operator in a particular 
year is a private company and 0 otherwise; 
• MANAG is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the private franchisee 
operates under a management (cost-plus) contract;  
• GROSS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the private franchisee 
operates under a gross cost contract;  
• NET is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the private franchisee operates 
under a net cost contract.  
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-Table 4: Sample descriptive statistics of the organisational variables- 
135 networks and 8 years 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
PUBLIC 0.0653 0.2470 0 1 
MIXED 0.2528 0.4348 0 1 
PRIVATE  0.6819 0.4659 0 1 
MANAG 0.1447 0.3520 0 1 
GROSS 0.2110 0.4082 0 1 
NET  0.3262 0.4690 0 1 
 
5. Results 
In order to determine the (in)efficiency properties of the different ownership regimes 
and regulatory contracts, we estimate the following translogarithmic production 
frontier model14: 
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with the technical inefficiency effect defined by two different equations: 
ititMIXEDitPUBLIC0it MIXEDPUBLICu ωδδδ +⋅+⋅+=    (1) 
ititNETitGROSSitCPLUS0it NETGROSSMANAGu ωδδδδ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=  (2) 
 
Thus, the first model (1) considers only the ownership variables in the inefficiency 
term and allows us to test hypotheses 1a and 1b, the parameters δ being interpreted 
relative to the omitted case, the delegation to private operators (PRIVATE). 
Model (2) allows to estimate the respective impacts on inefficiency of delegation to 
private companies through management contracts, and gross cost and net cost 
contracts and to compare them with the impact of the omitted cases, that is public 
administration (PUBLIC) and mixed ownership (MIXED). This model therefore allows 
us to test hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
All models were estimated using the FRONTIER 4.1 software (Coelli 1996). Our 
estimation results are presented in table 5 below. Tables 6 and 7 present some 
specification tests on our models. 
 
                                                 
14
 In order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we omit the cross-products between the 
inputs X and the control variables Z. 
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-Table 5: Production frontier estimation results- 
 
Dependent variable: vehicle-kilometres; 981 observations 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 
β0 8.698*** 
(27.779) 
8.763*** 
(28.067) 
βLAB 1.417*** 
(6.854) 
1.464*** 
(7.124) 
βEN -0.068 
(-0.266) 
-0.123 
(-0.486) 
βVE -0.367* 
(-1.865) 
-0.354* 
(-1.820) 
βNL 0.015*** 
(2.375) 
0.015*** 
(2.349) 
βPOP 0.053*** 
(3.569) 
0.051*** 
(3.480) 
βLAB,LAB 0.187*** 
(3.762) 
0.188*** 
(3.777) 
βLAB,EN -0.466*** 
(-4.996) 
-0.481*** 
(-5.213) 
βLAB,VE 0.005 
(0.057) 
0.018 
(0.179) 
βEN,EN 0.177*** 
(2.871) 
0.191*** 
(3.105) 
βEN,VE 0.133 
(1.469) 
0.119 
(1.323) 
βVE,VE -0.046 
(-0.748) 
-0.043 
(-0.704) 
   
δ0 -0.439*** 
(-3.612) 
0.009 
(0.815) 
δPUBLIC 0.294*** 
(4.467) - 
δMIXED 0.349*** 
(4.861) - 
δMANAG 
- 
-0.019 
(-1.387) 
δGROSS 
- 
-0.245*** 
(-19.223) 
δNET 
- 
-0.050*** 
(-2.182) 
 
  
2
u
2
v
2 σσσ +=  0.009*** (8.050) 
0.007*** 
(21.018) 
22
u / σσγ =  0.303*** (3.050) 
0.112*** 
(16.476) 
Log likelihood function 1074 1094 
LR test of one sided errors 40.439 80.183 
Number of restrictions 4 5 
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; p < .1. 
t-ratios are in parentheses. 
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-Table 6 : Specification tests (model 1)- 
 
Null hypothesis Test statistic15 Critical value Decision 
(1) No inefficiency effects 
H0 : γ=δ0=δPUBLIC=δMIXED=0 40.44 
2
%1χ (4)=12.48 Reject H0 
(1’) No impact of ownership on efficiency 
H0 : δPUBLIC=δMIXED=0 33.68 
2
%1χ (2)=9.21 Reject H0 
 
-Table 7 : Specification tests (model 2)- 
 
Null Hypothesis Test statistic Critical value Decision 
(2) No inefficiency effects 
H0 : γ=δ0=δCPLUS=δGROSS=δNET=0 
80.18 2%1χ (5)=14.32 Reject H0 
(2’) No impact of contractual schemes on 
efficiency 
H0 : δCPLUS=δGROSS=δNET=0 
80.12 2%1χ (3)=11.35 Reject H0 
 
For all models, the parameter γ is statistically different from zero. Moreover, the 
hypothesis that γ and the parameters of the different inefficiency functions (the δs) are 
jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected (tests 1 and 2). This indicates that the 
stochastic production frontier is an appropriate approach and that the inefficiency 
functions provide meaningful explanations of the sources of inefficiency. But before 
analysing the estimates of the parameters δ, we briefly comment our estimates of the 
coefficients of the stochastic frontier (the βs). 
To interpret more easily the estimated first-order parameters in the translog 
production functions, we calculated the production elasticities at the sample means16 
and obtained the following ratios: 
 
-Table 8 : Production elasticities- 
Production elasticity 
at the sample means 
Model 1 Model 2 
Labour 0.095 0.096 
Energy 0.651 0.653 
Vehicles 0.177 0.172 
Return to scale 0.923 0.921 
 
As expected, the estimated production elasticities of labour, energy and capital are 
positive implying that an increase in transit inputs results in a larger output. However, 
the elasticities of labour and capital are very low compared to the elasticity of energy. 
These differences might be explained by the fact that operators do not have the same 
room for manoeuvre for each type of input. They can modify the number of 
employees and the size of the fleet more easily than their energy consumption which 
translates into production elasticities of labour and capital that are lower than the 
                                                 
15
 The likelihood-ratio test statistic, λ= -2{log[Likelihood(H0)-log[Likelihood(H1)]}, has approximately 
chi-square distribution with parameter equal to the number of parameters assumed to be zero in the null 
hypothesis, H0, provided H0 is true. 
16
 For instance, labour elasticity is calculated at the sample means by the following formula : 
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elasticity of energy. Moreover, as noticed by De Borger & Kerstens (2000), in this 
industry, the substitution possibilities between labour and capital are very limited and 
at the same time the technological complementarities between the inputs ‘vehicles’ 
and ‘fuel’ are very strong.  
We also find that the returns to scale are below one at the sample means (table 8), 
which indicates that the medium-sized companies of our sample face limited 
decreasing returns to scale.  
Furthermore, consistently with our hypothesis, the length of the network is found to 
have a significant positive impact on the level of production (table 5). The longer the 
network, the larger the volume of outputs offered.  
At last, the number of inhabitants is found to have a positive impact on the number of 
vehicle-kilometres procured, which corroborates our hypothesis.  
Let us now turn to the core results of our paper, which relate to the inefficiency 
models. 
The null hypotheses 1’ and 2’, considered in tables 6 and 7, which specify that the 
inefficiency effects are not a linear function of the ownership regime and contractual 
schemes, are rejected at the 1% level of significance. This indicates that the 
inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier are clearly stochastic and are not 
unrelated to the ownership regime and to the contractual modes chosen by local 
authorities. This first result corroborates our general hypothesis according to which 
organizational and regulatory factors are significant determinants of technical 
efficiency.  
More precisely, it appears from model 1 that the ownership regime has a significant 
impact on efficiency in the UPT sector since the parameters δ0, δPUBLIC and δMIXED are all 
significantly different from zero at 1%. Consistently with our hypothesis 1a, public 
administrations and semi-public companies exhibit higher technical inefficiency than 
private operators (δPUBLIC and δMIXED are positive). In other words, choosing private 
companies to operate urban public transport services leads to a better use of the inputs 
and therefore, indirectly, to lower production costs. As already mentioned, this might 
be due to differences in managerial competences and incentives. This might also be 
due to the fact that private operators face competition at the contract attribution stage 
while public administrations and semi-public companies do not. 
On the other hand, hypothesis 1b is not corroborated by our results. The mixed form 
of ownership indeed appears to be the most inefficient regime in terms of technical 
efficiency (δMIXED is equal to 0.349 whereas δPUBLIC is equal to 0.294). Choosing a semi-
public operator for the procurement of UPT services seems therefore to be the worst 
choice a local authority can make.  
A possible interpretation of this result might be that mixed ownership induces 
opportunistic behaviours both from the local authority and from the private partner. 
With this governance regime, responsibilities are difficult to attribute. Hence 
incentives to be efficient are low. This result might also suggest that local authorities 
have less control over semi-public companies than over public administrations, or, in 
other words, that local authorities involved in semi-public companies are captured by 
their private partners so that their performance is even worse than the performance of 
public administrations. At last, an interpretation which does not exclude the previous 
ones refers to the dynamism of the local authorities that have chosen to operate their 
network directly, despite the general trend toward public-private partnership. One 
could indeed consider that the few public administrations of our sample are more 
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efficient than the semi-public companies because the municipalities who decided to 
manage directly their urban transport system are particularly proactive in that respect.  
However, this result has to be qualified since the coefficients δPUBLIC and δMIXED, although 
significantly different from each other17, are very close. Hence, there is actually a 
difference in terms of technical efficiency between public administrations and semi-
public operators but this difference is slight. 
 
To summarize these results, table 9 gives the mean inefficiency scores of urban public 
transport operators according to their type of ownership regime. The average technical 
inefficiency on the whole sample is 0.98906, which means that, on average, transit 
operators are not far away from their technical efficiency frontier. 
 
-Table 9: Mean inefficiency scores by type of ownership regime- 
 
Inefficiency score 
Public administrations Semi-public operators Private operators 
0.98369 0.97803 0.99366 
 
Regarding the incidence of contractual schemes on efficiency, the results of model 2 
suggest that private operators with management contracts are further from the 
production frontier than private operators with fixed-price contracts (δMANAG is superior 
to δGROSS and δNET) but the coefficient of the variable MANAG is different from zero only 
at the 20% level of significance. This result therefore slightly supports our hypothesis 
2a which conjectured that management contract was the worst regulatory scheme in 
term of technical efficiency.  
At last, hypothesis 2b is not validated by our estimations. Indeed, our results indicate 
that gross cost and net cost contracts are not equivalent in terms of incentives to 
technical efficiency. There is a significant difference between these two types of 
fixed-price contracts in favour of the gross cost contracts. In other words, private 
operators regulated by gross cost contracts are more efficient than operators under net 
cost contracts. This suggests that bearing the commercial risks as well as the industrial 
risks leads to lower technical efficiency. A possible interpretation of this 
counterintuitive result is that operators regulated by net cost contracts tend to focus on 
their commercial objectives (revenue increase) rather than on their cost minimizing 
objectives and are therefore less technically efficient than operators under gross cost 
contracts who do not support revenue risks. 
To summarize these results, table 10 gives the mean inefficiency scores of the private 
operators of urban transport systems according to their type of contractual scheme.  
 
                                                 
17
 The null hypothesis H0: δPUBLIC=δMIXED is indeed strongly rejected; the likelihood-ratio test statistic that 
we obtained is equal to 33.68 while the critical value of a chi-square at 1% is equal to 6.63.  
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-Table 10: Mean inefficiency scores by type of contracts- 
 
Inefficiency score (Mean score of the sample : 0.9840) 
Public and semi-
public 
Private operators 
with management 
contracts 
Private operators 
with gross cost 
contracts 
Private operators 
with net cost 
contracts 
0.9737 0.9807 0.9969 0.9872 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have estimated a production frontier model for an eight-year panel of 
French urban transport networks (981 network-year observations) using the 
methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Our objectives were twofold. 
First, we intended to measure the impact of ownership structure on technical 
efficiency. Second, we aimed at investigating the effects of the contractual practices 
on technical efficiency.  
The results of our estimations support the conjecture that technical efficiency cannot 
be measured independently of the institutional or regulatory constraints. According to 
our estimates, private operators outperform public ones and operators under cost-plus 
contracts exhibit a higher level of technical inefficiency than operators under fixed-
price agreements. Moreover, our database allowed us to introduce a third type of 
ownership regime, namely the semi-public regime, and to distinguish between two 
types of fixed-price contracts. Although such distinctions are fundamental to 
characterize the French UPT system, to our knowledge, our study is the only one to 
take into account this diversity of governance structures and contractual practices and 
our results reveal that such distinctions are fruitful. Indeed, our estimations clearly 
indicate that creating a public-private partnership via a semi-public company turns out 
to be the worst organisational choice a local authority can make in terms of technical 
efficiency. We also show that gross cost and net cost contracts have a differentiated 
impact on this measure of performance. Private operators regulated by gross cost 
contracts indeed reach the higher efficiency score.  
In terms of policy implications, this study suggests that launching organisational and 
regulatory reforms to improve the performance of urban transport systems might have 
significant effects. More precisely, significant positive results on technical efficiency 
are to be expected from delegated management and high-powered incentives 
regulatory contracts. Of course, performance encompasses other dimensions than 
technical efficiency like service quality which will have to be considered in order to 
complete our research agenda. This work is indeed a first step toward a more 
comprehensive assessment of the performance impact of governance changes in the 
urban transport sector.  
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